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Asia accounts for nearly 90 per cent of the world’s fishers, and is home to most 
of the approximately 4.36 million fishing vessels around the globe. The region 
is also, unsurprisingly, a hotbed of maritime disputes. Competing claims over 
marine boundaries and island ownership in Asia generate displays of national-
ism and confrontations amongst neighbouring countries, as well as entangling 
fishing boats in militarily-charged and politically-driven struggles. 
Are these disputes simply the result of an incidental spatial overlap? Or have 
fishing activities become tools of geopolitical strategy? 
My research looks at state strategies for the governance of fishing activities that 
assist military-political objectives — in other words, the use of mundane civil-
ian fishing operations as a tool in the extension of state legitimization and the 
reproduction of sovereignty claims in disputed waters. My initial investigations 
have focused on the Yellow Sea, an area west of the Korean peninsula, and a 
maritime boundary (part of the fallout of the Korean War) called the Northern 
Limit Line (NLL). 
The validity of the NLL has been disputed to the point of fatal clashes between 
the two Korean navies. Claiming de facto standing, South Korea controls the 
boundary by mobilizing political narratives and military forces, while the 
North denounces any attempt to legitimize the unilaterally-promulgated line. 
The Yeonpyeong Islands and its swimming crab fishery, lying just south of the 
NLL, have become embroiled in the dispute, acquiring high strategic impor-
tance solely as a result of their proximity to the NLL.
My investigations have yielded several interesting facts about the entangle-
ment of fishing activity with geo-political strategy: 
•	 The swimming crab fishers of the Yeonpyeong Islands’ observe the 
NLL by fishing within the state-enacted fishing zone; but they are 
also required to attend an annual, state-sponsored education session 
[about the area that reinforces the South Korean claim of sovereignty?]
•	 The continued fishing presence in the region has been used to justify 
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added military vigilance (via claims of a need for ‘protection’ of the 
fishers).
•	 The fishers themselves — instructed to report any suspicious at-sea 
objects to the state authority — have become a form of unofficial NLL 
surveillance on behalf of the state.
My investigation also unveiled a more complex reality — the fact that the 
fishers’ personal tendencies amount to a subtle refusal to cooperate with the 
imposition of a geopolitical agenda upon fishing operations: 
•	 Fishers — driven by economic, rather than political, imperatives — 
have displayed an inclination to infringe upon boundaries whenever 
they can.
•	 The maverick actions of fishers who violate boundaries for economic 
gain have sometimes triggered military responses that have not only 
exposed the porosity of the NLL, but have hindered Seoul’s efforts at 
firm control of the boundary.
The South Korean government, as a result, faces a dilemma in terms of im-
plementing this ‘fishy’ form of geo-political control: greater support for the 
fishing sector may widen the size and presence of the fishery, which, in turn, 
may benefit the nation’s political objectives via the natural enhancement of the 
government’s ideological justification of its sovereignty in an area in which it 
has a significant industrial presence. It  may also provide greater self-policing 
that would naturally arise from an increased number of fishing boats in the 
area.  On the other hand, a larger fishery could also mean more fishing boats 
making unauthorized detours across the NLL with subsequent increases in 
military responses, and still more disruption to a state agenda that requires the 
presentation of a closed and unassailable border.
The evidence seems to suggest that a strategy of deliberate involvement of 
fishery in the boundary disputes of the state fails to work as the state intends; 
or, at least, it will not work without entangling the fishers themselves in the 
strategic plans of the state. 
Given the growing importance of ocean space for shipping, resource extraction 
and geopolitical rivalry, an analysis of other Asian seas could not only unveil 
similar geo-political strategies and their results but also, hopefully, prevent the 
escalation of maritime conflicts between coastal states as well as ensure the 
safety of civilian fishers/fishery operators.
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